OpenPort Protocol: A Security Governance Specification for AI Agent Tool Access
OpenPort Protocol:面向 AI 智能體工具存取的安全治理規範
為 AI 智能體提供結構化工具存取,同時將授權、寫入控制與稽核牢牢保留在服務端。
Genliang Zhu, Chu Wang, Ziyuan Wang, Zhida Li, Qiang Li
研究概覽
AI 智能體需要的不只是一份可以呼叫的工具清單。系統還需要一條由服務端執行的治理邊界,用來決定某個憑證目前可以發現哪些能力、讀取哪些資料,以及寫入請求應如何被審查與執行。
OpenPort 透過感知授權的工具發現、作用域與屬性策略檢查、草稿優先寫入、高風險操作的 preflight 與重放保護、機器可處理的穩定失敗語義、速率限制及結構化稽核事件來定義這條邊界。參考執行環境與一致性驗證工具,則使這些治理要求能夠跨模型與智能體執行環境被實際執行和檢驗。
英文摘要
AI agents increasingly require direct, structured access to application data and actions, but production deployments still struggle to express and verify the governance properties that matter in practice: least-privilege authorization, controlled write execution, predictable failure handling, abuse resistance, and auditability. This paper introduces OpenPort Protocol (OPP), a governance-first specification for exposing application tools through a secure server-side gateway that is model- and runtime-neutral and can bind to existing tool ecosystems. OpenPort defines authorization-dependent discovery, stable response envelopes with machine-actionable agent.* reason codes, and an authorization model combining integration credentials, scoped permissions, and ABAC-style policy constraints. For write operations, OpenPort specifies a risk-gated lifecycle that defaults to draft creation and human review, supports time-bounded auto-execution under explicit policy, and enforces high-risk safeguards including preflight impact binding and idempotency. To address time-of-check/time-of-use drift in delayed approval flows, OpenPort also specifies an optional State Witness profile that revalidates execution-time preconditions and fails closed on state mismatch. Operationally, the protocol requires admission control (rate limits/quotas) with stable 429 semantics and structured audit events across allow/deny/fail paths so that client recovery and incident analysis are deterministic. We present a reference runtime and an executable governance toolchain (layered conformance profiles, negative security tests, fuzz/abuse regression, and release-gate scans) and evaluate the core profile at a pinned release tag using artifact-based, externally reproducible validation.
核心貢獻
- 01
協定契約
定義與模型和執行環境無關的工具發現及呼叫介面,包括端點、回應封裝、工具中繼資料與穩定的 agent.* 原因碼。
- 02
受治理的執行路徑
將整合憑證、作用域與 ABAC 風格策略約束,同草稿優先寫入、preflight 影響綁定、冪等性、可選 State Witness、速率限制和結構化稽核結合起來。
- 03
可執行驗證
將規範與參考執行環境、分層一致性設定、負向安全測試、模糊及濫用回歸測試和發佈門禁配套交付。
證據與適用範圍
本文目前是 arXiv v1 預印本,其驗證對象是在 v0.1.0 標籤下最小參考執行環境所呈現的協定不變量。論文並未宣稱該最小執行環境已具備生產就緒性;當時仍有部分增強控制處於部分覆蓋或後續工作階段,生產部署還需要持久化治理狀態、分散式准入控制及經過強化的領域適配器。
引用本文
建議使用 DOI 作為穩定引用。下方 BibTeX 記錄對應本頁面標示的 arXiv 版本。
Zhu, G., Wang, C., Wang, Z., Li, Z., & Li, Q. (2026). OpenPort Protocol: A Security Governance Specification for AI Agent Tool Access [Preprint]. arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2602.20196
@misc{zhu2026openport,
title = {{OpenPort Protocol: A Security Governance Specification for AI Agent Tool Access}},
author = {Zhu, Genliang and Wang, Chu and Wang, Ziyuan and Li, Zhida and Li, Qiang},
year = {2026},
month = feb,
eprint = {2602.20196},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
primaryClass = {cs.CR},
doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2602.20196},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20196},
note = {arXiv:2602.20196v1}
}